Abstract. Viewing the language of modal logic as a language for describing directed graphs, a natural type of directed graph to study modally is one where the nodes are sets and the edge relation is the subset or superset relation. A well-known example from the literature on intuitionistic logic is the class of Medvedev frames hW, Ri where W is the set of nonempty subsets of some nonempty finite set S, and xRy i↵ x ◆ y, or more liberally, where hW, Ri is isomorphic as a directed graph to h}(S) \ {;}, ◆i. Prucnal [32] proved that the modal logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable. Here we continue the study of Medvedev frames with extended modal languages. Our results concern definability. We show that the class of Medvedev frames is definable by a formula in the language of tense logic, i.e., with a converse modality for quantifying over supersets in Medvedev frames, extended with any one of the following standard devices: nominals (for naming nodes), a di↵erence modality (for quantifying over those y such that x 6 = y), or a complement modality (for quantifying over those y such that x 6 ◆ y). It follows that either the logic of Medvedev frames in one of these tense languages is finitely axiomatizablewhich would answer the open question of whether Medvedev's [31] "logic of finite problems" is decidable-or else the minimal logics in these languages extended with our defining formulas are the beginnings of infinite sequences of frame-incomplete logics.
Introduction
Modal logics have been found to capture properties of many important mathematical concepts-for example, the modal logic of topological closure [5] , the modal logic of arithmetic provability [9] , the modal logic of set-theoretic forcing [25] , and more. In this paper, we are interested in modal logics for capturing properties of something very basic: the subset and superset relations between the nonempty subsets of a finite set.
By the unimodal language, we mean the language given by the grammar ' ::= p | ¬' | ('^') | ⇤', where p belongs to a countably infinite set Prop of propositional variables, the other Boolean connectives are defined as usual, and ⌃' := ¬⇤¬'. We take as models for the unimodal language tuples M = hW, R, V i based on frames hW, Ri, where hW, Ri is any directed graph and V : Prop ! }(W ). We define the truth of a formula ' at a point w 2 W as usual:
• M, w ✏ p i↵ w 2 V (p) for p 2 Prop; • M, w ✏ ¬' i↵ M, w 2 '; • M, w ✏ '^ i↵ M, w ✏ ' and M, w ✏ ; • M, w ✏ ⇤' i↵ for all v 2 W : if wRv, then M, v ✏ '. A formula ' is valid over a frame hW, Ri i↵ ' is true at every point in every model based on hW, Ri. For a class C of frames, the unimodal logic of C is the set of all unimodal formulas that are valid over every frame in C.
Viewing a modal language as a language for describing directed graphs in this way, a natural type of directed graph to study modally is one where the nodes in W are sets and the edge relation R is the subset or superset relation. We will focus on a specific class of such structures. Definition 1.1 (Medvedev Frames) . A Medvedev frame [31] is a frame hW, Ri that is isomorphic, as a directed graph, to h}(S) \ {;}, ◆i for a nonempty finite set S. (A Skvortsov frame [37] is defined in the same way except with S a nonempty set of any cardinality.)
Equivalently, we could think in terms of h}(S) \ {S}, ✓i, or we could simply define a Medvedev frame to be a frame hW, Ri that is obtained from a finite Boolean lattice hW, i by removing the top element. We are following the literature on intuitionistic logic (see references after Theorem 1.2 below) by thinking in terms of h}(S)\{;}, ◆i. Medvedev frames are often defined as frames h}(S) \ {;}, ◆i for a nonempty finite set S, but Definition 1.1 will be more convenient for our purposes, allowing us to speak of "defining the class of Medvedev frames" rather than always "defining the class of Medvedev frames up to isomorphism." Informally, we blur the distinction.
Where M is a model based on a Medvedev frame, we have:
Now what modal principles are valid over Medvedev frames? We will see some examples in §2, but we cannot hope for a finite axiomatization.
Theorem 1.2 (Prucnal [32] ). The unimodal logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable.
It is an open question whether the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames is recursively axiomatizable. An a rmative answer to this question would also yield an a rmative answer to the longstanding open question of whether the intuitionistic propositional logic of Medvedev frames (see [12, Ch. 2] ) is recursively axiomatizable; for the intuitionistic logic of Medvedev framesMedvedev's [30, 31] "logic of finite problems"-is recursively embedded in the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames by the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation of the intuitionistic language into the unimodal language. Maksimova et al. [29] showed that the intuitionistic logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable (cf. [14, 15] ). As Shehtman [36] observes, that result, combined with the Blok-Esakia Isomorphism Theorem, gives another proof of Theorem 1.2. 2 Since the class of Medvedev frames is a recursive class of finite frames, the modal and intuitionistic logics of Medvedev frames are corecursively enumerable; so if they are recursively axiomatizable and hence enumerable, then they are decidable. 3 We will return to this issue below.
In addition to its connection with Medvedev's logic of finite problems, the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames has recently appeared in the study of modal logics of set-theoretic forcing for certain forcing classes in [24] .
The main topic of the present paper is the modal definability of the class of Medvedev frames in the following standard sense (see, e.g., [4] ). Definition 1.3 (Relative and Absolute Definability). For classes C and D of frames and a modal formula ' (of the unimodal language above or any of the modal languages discussed below), ' defines C relative to D i↵ for every frame hW, Ri 2 D, hW, Ri 2 C i↵ ' is valid over hW, Ri; and ' defines C (absolutely) i↵ for every frame hW, Ri, hW, Ri 2 C i↵ ' is valid over hW, Ri.
Using only the unimodal language, the class of Medvedev frames is obviously not definable, since the class is not closed under operations on frames 2 In fact, stronger results hold: Maksimova et al. [29] showed that the intuitionistic logic of Medvedev frames (resp. Skvortsov frames) is not axiomatizable in finitely many propositional variables, and Shehtman [36] showed the same for the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames (resp. Skvortsov frames). 3 The intuitionistic logic of Skvortsov frames is known to be recursively axiomatizable [37] , but it is unknown whether it is decidable. that preserve validity of unimodal formulas (see [8, §3.3] ), e.g., taking disjoint unions of frames. Even relative to, e.g., the class of finite frames that are not disjoint unions of other frames, the class of Medvedev frames is not definable in the unimodal language, because it is not closed under taking R-generated subframes (though it is closed under taking R [ R 1 -generated subframes). Of course, if we view Medvedev frames as structures for a firstorder language with a relation symbol for R, then the class of Medvedev frames is not definable by a first-order formula either, given compactness.
None of this forecloses definability in an extended modal language. As a natural candidate, we first consider the nominal tense language [7] that extends the unimodal language with nominals and a converse modality, with which we can name sets and quantify over supersets in Medvedev frames. Definition 1.4 (Language). Fixing a countably infinite set Nom-the set of nominals-such that Prop \ Nom = ;, the nominal tense language is given by grammar
The tense language is the fragment without nominals in formulas. The nominal modal language is the fragment without the converse modality ⇤ 1 in formulas.
The intended semantics for this language is as follows. 
The definition of truth of a nominal tense formula at a point w in a model M is defined in the same way as above, except for the new clauses:
So where M is based on a Medvedev frame:
A formula of the nominal tense language is valid over a frame hW, Ri i↵ it is true at every point in every nominal model based on hW, Ri. For a class C of frames, the nominal tense logic of C is the set of all nominal tense formulas that are valid over every frame in C.
For the theory of modal languages with nominals, in addition to [7] , see, e.g., [17, 10, 6, 11] . For general results on frame definability in nominal modal languages, see [7, 17, 10] . Note, however, that since the class of Medvedev frames is not a first-order definable class of frames, some of the Goldblatt-Thomason-style definability theorems do not apply.
Since the class of Medvedev frames is not closed under R-generated subframes, it is not definable by a formula of the nominal modal language, for the validity of such formulas is preserved under R-generated subframes; and since it is not closed under disjoint unions, it is not definable by a formula of the tense language. However, we shall see that with their powers combined, the nominal tense language can define the class of Medvedev frames.
A language with as much frame-defining power as the nominal tense language is the tense language with a di↵erence modality (see, e.g., [34, 33, 27] and [8, §7.1]), given by the grammar
and the following semantics:
For lack of a better term, we will call this the di↵erential tense language. The following result follows easily from the proof in §4.1.II of [17] concerning the unimodal language extended with [6 =]. Theorem 1.6 (Gargov and Goranko [17] ). If a class of frames is definable in the nominal tense language, it is definable in the di↵erential tense language.
Thus, by our result that the class of Medvedev frames is definable in the nominal tense language, it is also definable in the di↵erential tense language.
As shown in [17] , the converse of Theorem 1.6 holds if we add to the nominal tense language the universal modality, which is already definable in the di↵erential language by ⌅' := '^[6 =]'. Otherwise the di↵erential tense language has more frame-defining power. For example, the formula ¬[6 =]? defines a class of frames that is not definable in the nominal tense language.
For an alternative route to defining the class of Medvedev frames, we can extend the unimodal language with not only a modality ⇤ 1 for the converse of R, but also a modality for the complement of R [2, 26, 19, 18, 21, 20, 3] . Definition 1.7 (Language). The complementary tense language is given by the grammar The intended semantics for this language is as follows. Definition 1.8 (Models, Truth, and Validity). Models for the complementary tense language are the same as models for the unimodal language. The truth clause for the modality is:
Validity over frames is defined as in the case of the unimodal language. For a class C of frames, the complementary tense logic of C is the set of all complementary tense formulas that are valid over every frame in C.
For general results on frame definability in this language, see [21, §6] . The nominal tense language and complementary tense language are incomparable in frame-defining power. For example, the nominal tense formula i ! ⌃¬i defines the class of frames such that 8x9y(xRy^x 6 = y); yet this class is not definable by a formula of the complementary tense language [21, Lemma 6.3(i)], because the validity of such formulas is preserved under taking (the tense version of) p-morphic images (see §5), whereas the class is not closed under that operation. Conversely, the complementary tense formula ⌃ > defines the class of frames such that 8x9y ¬xRy; yet this class is not definable by a formula of the nominal tense language, because the validity of such formulas is preserved under taking R [ R 1 -generated subframes [7, p. 62] , whereas the class is not closed under that operation.
Given this incomparability in expressive power, it is informative to know that not only the nominal and di↵erential tense languages but also the complementary tense language can define the class of Medvedev frames.
From our main definability results, a tantalizing disjunction follows: either the logic of Medvedev frames in one of the three tense languages is finitely axiomatizable-which would answer the open question of whether Medvedev's logic of finite problems is decidable, as above-or the minimal logics in the three languages extended with our Medvedev-defining formulas as axioms are the beginnings of infinite sequences of frame-incomplete logics.
For if the minimal logic with our Medvedev-defining formula as an axiomcall it L 0 -is the logic of any class of frames at all, then it is the logic of the class of Medvedev frames, which is then finitely axiomatizable. Thus, if the logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable, then not only is L 0 frame incomplete, but also there is an infinite sequence L 1 , L 2 , . . . of logics such that the following holds: L n+1 extends L n with a non-theorem of L n that is valid over Medvedev frames, which is possible by the hypothesis of L n 's incompleteness; then L n+1 still defines the class of Medvedev frames, but by its finite axiomatization it is not complete with respect to the class of Medvedev frames; so L n+1 is not complete with respect to any class of frames. By similar reasoning, if the logic of Medvedev frames is not even recursively axiomatizable, then adding any recursive set of formulas from the logic of Medvedev frames to L 0 will result in a frame-incomplete logic.
In § §2-3, we prove our definability theorem for the nominal tense language. It is then a short step in §4 to prove the result for the complementary tense language. In § §5-6, we draw some morals about the definability and prospects for axiomatizability of the class of Medvedev frames in di↵erent languages. In our conclusion in §7, we return to the disjunction above.
Nominal Tense Axioms
Let AX 1 be the set of the following axioms:
Although these axioms will not define the class of Medvedev frames absolutely, but only relative to the class of finite frames (Theorem 3.5), we single them out as a group because they are all pure nominal formulas, i.e., containing no propositional variables, a point to which we will return below. The T N and 4 N axioms are just the pure nominal, diamond versions of the standard modal axioms T (⇤p ! p) and 4 (⇤p ! ⇤⇤p), respectively.
Dropping the restriction to pure formulas, let AX 2 be the set of the following axioms:
One can think of the Grz axiom in AX 2 as replacing the T N , 4 N , and Anti N axioms in AX 1 , based on the semantic Fact 2.2 below. Syntactically, any normal modal logic that contains the Grz axiom also contains the T axiom and-much less obviously-the 4 axiom [1] . 4 Remark 2.1. Let us briefly note some syntactic facts about the Uni axiom. First, consider the generalizations of Uni for arbitrary n 2:
One can show that for each n 2, the formula above belongs to the smallest normal unimodal logic containing Uni and the 4 axiom. Second, the same can be shown for the formula
and its generalizations for arbitrary n 3, which Hamkins et al. [24] note are valid over Medvedev frames. We prove these facts in the Appendix. In addition, using results of [13] , we show that there are still continuum-many normal unimodal logics between, on the one hand, the logic axiomatized by Grz and Uni, and on the other, the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames.
The axioms T N , 4 N , Anti N , and Grz/Grz 1 are standard axioms, whose associated classes of frames are plain to see-except perhaps in the case of Grz, the Grzegorczyk axiom, one of the famous examples of a modal formula that defines a non-first-order class of frames (see, e.g., [12, p. 83 
]).
Fact 2.2 (Frames for the Standard Axioms). For any frame hW, Ri:
4. hW, Ri validates Grz (resp. Grz 1 ) i↵ R (resp. R 1 ) is a Noetherian partial order, i.e., a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation that contains no infinite ascending chain of distinct elements.
The other axioms are not standard, but their associated classes of frames are also easy to work out. The term 'Sep N ' suggests separative; 'Con 1 N ' suggests convergence in the R 1 direction; and 'Uni' suggests union, for reasons that will become clear. The notion of a separative poset comes from the literature on set-theoretic forcing (see, e.g., [28, p. 4] 
V (q) = {z 2 W | y 1 Rz or y 2 Rz}. Thus, from xRy 1 and xRy 2 , we have M, x ✏ ⌃(p 1^⇤ q)^⌃(p 2^⇤ q). Now suppose for reductio that M, x ✏ ⌃(⌃p 1^⌃ p 2^⇤ ⌃q), so there is a u with xRu and M, u ✏ ⌃p 1^⌃ p 2^⇤ ⌃q. Since M, u ✏ ⌃p 1^⌃ p 2 , we have uRy 1 and uRy 2 , so there is a v as in (I). Since for all w with vRw, we have neither y 1 Rw nor y 2 Rw, it follows that M, v 2 ⌃q, which with uRv implies M, u 2 ⇤⌃q, which contradicts the description of u. Thus, M, x 2 ⌃(⌃p 1^⌃ p 2^⇤ ⌃q), so M, x falsifies Uni.
Remark 2.4. We can now see semantically or syntactically that the Uni axiom is a modal version of the superintuitionistic Kreisel-Putnam axiom
, which belongs to Medvedev's logic of finite problems [12, p. 54] . Semantically, the condition (Uni) is necessary and su cient for a poset hW, Ri to validate kp according to intuitionistic Kripke semantics [12, Exercise 2.10] (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this correspondence). Syntactically, if we take the Gödel translation [12, §3.9] of kp, contrapose the main conditional, drive negations in, and rearrange some subformulas, we obtain the formula kpm := ⇤((⌃(⌃¬b^⇤⌃¬a)^⌃(⌃¬c^⇤⌃¬a)) ! ⌃(⌃¬b^⌃¬c^⇤⌃¬a)
◆ y 00 (i.e., y 0 = y 00 since y 0 is a singleton and y 00 6 = ;), we have x 6 ◆ y 00 . For (Con 1 ), take x to be the union of the sets y 1 and y 2 . For (Uni), take u to be the union of the sets y 1 and y 2 . For completeness, we can start with the nominal tense logic of all frames, which can be axiomatized in various ways (see, e.g., [7, 17, 10] ) and then add the axioms of AX 1 or AX 2 (closing under rules). For AX 1 , the result will be a logic that is complete with respect to the class of frames defined by the conjunction of the axioms in AX 1 . This follows from the fact that AX 1 contains only pure nominal formulas. As in the case of Sahlqvist axioms [8, §3] , so too in the case of pure axioms, there is an automatic completeness theorem. 5 To apply this theorem, which is usually stated for an arbitrary nominal multimodal language, note that we may freely switch between interpreting the nominal tense language in frames hW, Ri and interpreting it in birelational frames hW, R 1 , R 2 i where ⇤ is the box modality for R 1 , ⇤ 1 is the box modality for R 2 , and R 2 = R 1 1 (cf. the notion of a polymodal base in [20, 21] ). Within the class of birelational frames, the class of frames with R 2 = R 1 1 is defined by the pure axioms i ! ⇤⌃ 1 i and i ! ⇤ 1 ⌃i. Thus, the following result for arbitrary nominal multimodal logics gives us automatic completeness results for nominal tense logics as well.
Theorem 2.6 (Gargov and Goranko [17] ). If a class C of multirelational frames is defined by a set ⌃ of pure nominal multimodal formulas, then the nominal multimodal logic of C is obtained by adding to the minimal nominal multimodal logic the formulas of ⌃ as axioms (and closing under rules).
In the case of AX 2 , which has non-pure axioms, the question of completeness does not have such an easy answer. We will return to it in §6.
Definability of Medvedev Frames
In this section, we show that AX 1 defines the class of Medvedev frames relative to the class of finite frames (Theorem 3.5), and AX 2 defines the class of Medvedev frames absolutely (Theorem 3.6). Our helpers in this task are the endpoints in Medvedev frames, representing singleton sets. 
A McKinsey frame [12, p. 82 ] is a frame hW, Ri such that for every w 2 W , end(w) 6 = ;. 7 Note that any finite poset and any Noetherian poset is a McKinsey frame. The reason we call attention to McKinsey frames is that it is worthwhile to clearly separate which parts of the argument to follow depend on finiteness and which parts depend on the weaker McKinsey property that holds not only of Medvedev frames but also of Skvortsov frames.
The argument involves three lemmas, the first of which is easy to check. The second lemma is an alternative characterization of Medvedev frames. 6 Note that this is not the same as the notion of an atom/coatom in a poset, since an atom/coatom is required to be a non-minimum/maximum element. Nonetheless, what we call 'McKinsey frames' are sometimes called 'atomic frames'. 7 As is well known, the class of transitive McKinsey frames is definable by the conjunction of the 4 axiom ⇤p ! ⇤⇤p and the McKinsey axiom ⇤⌃p ! ⌃⇤p. Blackburn [7, p. 64f] shows that no purely nominal formula defines the class of transitive McKinsey frames. His proof also shows that no such formula defines the Noetherian posets. Then since W is finite, by ([) there is a u 2 W such that end(u) = Y , so f (u) = Y . Finally, since hW, Ri is separative, transitive, and McKinsey, by Lemma 3.2.1-2 we have wRv i↵ f (w) ◆ f (v). Thus, f is an isomorphism. From 2 to 3, since W 6 = ;, if hW, Ri is isomorphic to h}(endhW, Ri) \ {;}, ◆i, then }(endhW, Ri) \ {;} 6 = ;, so endhW, Ri 6 = ;. Then hW, Ri is a Medvedev frame as in Definition 1.1 with S = endhW, Ri.
From 3 to 1, observe that 1 holds whenever hW, Ri = h}(S)\{;}, ◆i for a nonempty finite S, and 1 is preserved under directed graph isomorphism.
The third lemma relates the property (Uni) from Fact 2.3 with the property ([) from Lemma 3.3. Recall that (Uni) is 8x8y 1 8y 2 ((xRy 1^x Ry 2 ) ! 9u(xRu^uRy 1^u Ry 2^8 v(uRv ! 9w(vRw^(y 1 Rw _ y 2 Rw))))). For part 2, suppose hW, Ri is a transitive frame satisfying (Con 1 ). Then to prove the implication from (Uni) to ([), suppose that hW, Ri does not satisfy ([), so there are y 1 , y 2 2 W such that (ii) for all u 2 W , end(u) 6 = end(y 1 ) [ end(y 2 ). By (Con 1 ), there is an x such that xRy 1 and xRy 2 . Now suppose for reductio that hW, Ri satisfies (Uni). Then since xRy 1 and xRy 2 , there is a u as in (Uni). Thus, uRy 1 and uRy 2 , which with Lemma 3.2.1 implies end(u) ◆ end(y 1 ) [ end(y 2 ), which with (ii) implies end(u) 6 ✓ end(y 1 )[end(y 2 ). Take a v 2 end(u)\(end(y 1 )[end(y 2 )), so uRv but it is not the case that y 1 Rv or y 2 Rv. Then since v is an endpoint, we have that for all w with vRw, it is not the case that y 1 Rw or y 2 Rw. But this contradicts the fact that u is as in (Uni). Thus, hW, Ri does not satisfy (Uni).
We are now ready to put everything together for AX 1 . It is worth noting that the nominal tense language can define any single finite frame up to isomorphism [7, §2] [17, §4.2] (cf. [21, p. 96 ] on the complementary tense language). In the case of "the" Medvedev frame hW, Ri with |W | = n, once we have a set of axioms like AX 1 that defines the class of Medvedev frames relative to the class of finite frames, one can add two simple axioms constraining numbers of successors in order to define the frame.
For the axiom set AX 2 , we have the following stronger result. and Uni, it satisfies (Con 1 ) and (Uni) by Fact 2.3, so it satisfies ([) by Lemma 3.4.2. Now we will define an infinite sequence x 1 , x 2 , . . . of distinct points from W such that end(x i ) ✓ end(x i+1 ) and end(x i+1 ) is finite. Take x 1 to be any element of endhW, Ri. Having picked x n , since end(x n ) is finite and endhW, Ri infinite, we can pick a y 2 endhW, Ri \ end(x n ). Then by ([), there is an x n+1 such that end(x n+1 ) = end(x n ) [ end(y). Since end(y) = {y} and y 6 2 end(x n ), it follows that x n+1 is distinct from x n . Since end(x i ) ✓ end(x i+1 ) and hW, Ri is a separative McKinsey poset, it follows by Lemma 3.2.2 that x i R 1 x i+1 . Thus, we have an infinite R 1 -chain of distinct points, which contradicts the assumption that Grz 1 is valid on hW, Ri, by Fact 2.2.4. Hence hW, Ri is finite, which completes the proof.
By Theorems 3.6 and 1.6, the class of Medvedev frames is also definable in the di↵erential tense language. In particular, the axioms
correspond to (Sep) and (Con 1 ), respectively.
Complementary Tense Axioms
It is evident from §3 that it is now su cient for proving that some other extended tense language can define the class of Medvedev frames that we show it can define the properties (Sep) and (Con 1 ). For the complementary tense language discussed in §1, this is done with the following axioms. Proof. For part 1, from right to left, suppose hW, Ri satisfies (Sep) and for some model M = hW, R, V i and x 2 W , M, x ✏ ⌃ p^ q, so there is a y such that M, y ✏ p and not xRy, and (i) for all z such that not xRz, M, z ✏ q. Since hW, Ri satisfies (Sep), it follows from not xRy that there is a y 0 with yRy 0 such that for all y 00 with y 0 Ry 00 , not xRy 00 , so M, y 00 ✏ q by (i). Thus, M, y ✏ p^⌃⇤q, which with not xRy implies M, x ✏ ⌃ (p^⌃⇤q). From left to right, suppose hW, Ri does not satisfy (Sep), so there are x, y such that not xRy, but (ii) for all y 0 with yRy 0 there is a y 00 with y 0 Ry 00 and xRy 00 . Define a model M = hW, R, V i such that V (p) = {y} and V (q) = {z 2 W | not xRz}.
Part 2 is also straightforward.
Let us call the formulas in Fact 4.1 'Sep C ' and 'Con 1 C ', respectively. By the same reasoning as in the proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 3.6, but now using 
On Separativity
In several ways, the property (Sep) is more di cult to handle than the property (Con 1 ). For example, (Con 1 ) can be captured in the tense language extended with only the universal modality ⌅ with the truth clause:
As usual, define the existential modality by ⌥' := ¬⌅¬'.
Fact 5.1 (Definability with the Universal Modality). For any frame hW, Ri, ⌥p ! ⌃ 1 ⌃p is valid over hW, Ri i↵ R satisfies (Con 1 ).
8 With a modality 1 for the complement of the converse of R instead of the complement of R itself, the defining formula can be simplified to ⌃ 1 r ! ⌃⇤⌃ 1 r. 9 For definability relative to the class of reflexive frames, the defining formula can be simplified to ⌃ p ! ⌃ 1 ⌃p.
However, (Sep) eludes the power of the universal modality. To see this, recall that a p-morphism from a frame hW, Ri to a frame hW 0 , R 0 i is a function f : W ! W 0 such that for all x, y 2 W and y 0 2 W 0 :
• if xRy, then f (x)R 0 f (y) (homomorphism condition);
• if f (x)R 0 y 0 , then 9y 2 W : xRy and f (y) = y 0 (back condition
, R 0 i is a tense-morphic image of hW, Ri i↵ there is a surjective tense morphism from hW, Ri to hW 0 , R 0 i. Fact 5.2 (Separative Frames). The class of separative frames as in (Sep) is closed under disjoint unions and R-generated subframes. However, it is not closed under p-morphic images or even tense-morphic images.
Proof. Closure under taking disjoint unions is obvious and closure under Rgenerated subframes is easy to check. For the failure of closure under tensemorphic images, simply take the reflexive closure of the "forking" frame h{x 1 , y 1 , y 2 }, {hx 1 , y 1 i, hx 1 , y 2 i}i, which is a separative frame, the reflexive closure of the non-forking frame h{x, y}, {hx, yi}i, which is not separative, and the surjective tense morphism {hx 1 , xi, hy 1 , yi, hy 2 , yi}.
Since the validity of formulas in the tense language with the universal modality is preserved under taking tense-morphic images of frames (see [22] for the analogous result for the unimodal language extended with the universal modality), Fact 5.2 implies the following. This is why we went beyond adding the universal modality and added the complement modality , with which the universal modality can be expressed by ⇤'^ '. Unfortunately, adding the complement modality to capture separativity makes completeness proofs trickier, as explained in §6.
Considerations on Completeness
The cost of adding modalities like is well-known [20, 21] , but worth repeating in our story here. It becomes clear when we think of our languages as interpreted in models with di↵erent relations for the modalities. Suppose we have a trimodal language with operators ⇤ 1 , ⇤ 2 , and ⇤ 3 interpreted in trirelational models hW, R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , V i using the usual truth clauses:
Suppose we want to construct for a logic a canonical model in which R 2 is the converse of R 1 , while R 3 is the complement of R 1 . (Here we assume familiarity with the theory of canonical models, as in [8, §4] .) As is well known, the converse part is no problem. The class of trirelational frames in which R 2 = R 1 1 is defined by the conjunction of the axioms p ! ⇤ 1 ⌃ 2 p and p ! ⇤ 2 ⌃ 1 p. Since these are Sahlqvist formulas, they are canonical, so the canonical frames for logics with these axioms will be such that R 2 = R 1 1 . By contrast, the complement part presents di culties. Since the validity of trimodal formulas is preserved under taking disjoint unions of trirelational frames, we cannot define the class of frames in which R 3 is the complement of R 1 . We can define the class of frames in which R 1 [ R 3 is an equivalence relation, using the S5 axioms for the modality ⇤ 1,3 defined by ⇤ 1,3 ' := ⇤ 1 '^⇤ 3 '. Since those axioms are Sahlqvist, the canonical frames for logics with those axioms will be such that R 1 [ R 3 is an equivalence relation; then taking the submodel of the canonical model generated by a point w will give us a model based on a frame in which R 1 [ R 3 is the universal relation, R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 retain properties preserved under generated subframes-such as R 2 = R 1 1 , (Sep), (Uni), and (Con 1 )-and w satisfies the same formulas as before. 10 However, delicate work is required to not only make R 1 [ R 3 the universal relation, but also make R 1 \ R 3 = ;, as required for R 3 to be the complement of R 1 , all the while preserving desired properties of the relations. A "copying method" was developed by Vakarelov [38, 19] and generalized by Goranko [20] in order to achieve this purpose while preserving many standard first-order properties of the relations. But the situation becomes more complicated when we add further requirements on the relations, such as (Sep), (Uni), and (Con 1 ), not to mention second-order requirements on R 1 and R 2 such as those imposed by the axioms Grz and Grz 1 . In light of these considerations, the nominal tense language may seem to o↵er a simpler path. When the minimal nominal tense or modal logic is formulated with a Gabbay-style rule, one can construct canonical models in which every maximally consistent set contains a nominal [17, §5.2], which 10 To be clear: the property (Con 1 ) of frames hW, Ri is not preserved under R-generated subframes, though it is preserved under R [ R 1 -generated subframes. In the trirelational setting, we are thinking of (Con 1 ) as 8y8y
. This property is indeed preserved by generated (i.e., R 1 [ R 2 [ R 3 -generated) subframes of trirelational frames.
allows pure axioms such as those in AX 1 to enforce first-order properties on the canonical frame. (Without the Gabbay-style rule, more work is required, such as bulldozing the canonical model [7, §4] .) However, since the axiom set AX 2 is only valid over finite frames, matters are not so simple. One may think of AX 2 as essentially AX 1 plus the axioms Grz and Grz 1 . As noted in §2, by themselves the axioms of AX 1 are no problem: by the general completeness result for logics with pure axioms (Theorem 2.6), the minimal nominal tense logic extended with AX 1 is complete with respect to its class of frames. By themselves the axioms Grz and Grz 1 in AX 2 are also not a problem: by a general completeness result of ten Cate [10, Thm. 8.2.13] and known facts about these axioms, the minimal nominal tense logic extended with Grz and Grz 1 is also complete with respect to its class of frames. The question is if one can repeat these success stories for the whole of AX 2 .
Conclusion
There is a theme running through Theorems 3.6 and 4.2 and other examples of the impressive expressive power of the tense language extended with nominals or the complement modality-for example, that these languages can define the order structure of the natural numbers up to isomorphism (see [7, p. 61] and [21, p. 98] ). The theme is that the nominals or complement modality are used only to express certain first-order properties of the relation R that are inexpressible in the tense language, while the second-order heavy lifting is done by formulas in the basic tense language, such as the Grzegorczyk or Löb axioms. Of course, there are many simple first-order properties of directed graphs that the tense languages with nominals or the complement modality cannot express, so success is not a foregone conclusion. But in a number of important cases, these languages can express the first-order properties we need. For Theorems 3.6 and 4.2, the first-order properties we need are just that R is separative and that any two points have a common R-predecessor. The basic tense language does the rest.
Our results raise a number of related questions. We have focused on the issue of definability with extended modal languages of the class of Medvedev frames. What about the class of Skvortsov frames? And what if we consider frames that do not contain all nonempty subsets of a set S, but only those subsets of cardinality greater than some fixed   |S|, as in [35] ?
Let us finally return to the "tantalizing disjunction" at the end of §1. Logicians of the Sofia school, the Amsterdam school, and others have developed a set of techniques for proving the frame completeness (or incompleteness) of modal logics with nominals [7, 17, 10] , the di↵erence modality [33] , or the complement modality [19, 18, 20] . In addition, techniques for proving completeness and filtration for the logic Grz are well known [9] , 11 and even the nominal extension of Grz has been studied [6] . Could some of these techniques be used to prove the frame completeness of a logic extending the minimal nominal, di↵erential, or complementary tense logics with our Medvedev-defining axioms, perhaps adding some recursive set of Medvedevvalid axioms? And what about the logic of Medvedev frames in the basic tense language without extra devices-is it finitely or at least recursively axiomatizable? We leave these questions as open problems for future research.
As a substitution instance of (Uni), we have (⌃('^⇤ 0 )^⌃(p n+1^⇤ 0 )) ! ⌃(⌃'^⌃p n+1^⇤ ⌃ 0 )).
The antecedent of (V) is clearly derivable from that of (III) using (IV). Thus, to show that (III) is derivable, it su ces to establish the derivability of
Unpacking ' and 0 , (VI) works out to
which is easily seen to be a theorem of K4.
For the second part of Remark 2.1, we claim that for each m 3, the following formula is a theorem of K4Uni: Finally, let GrzUni be the smallest normal unimodal logic containing Grz and Uni, and let Medv be the unimodal logic of Medvedev frames.
Proposition 7.1. There are continuum-many normal unimodal logics between GrzUni and Medv.
The following proof combines observations of Matthew Harrison-Trainor and James Walsh (personal communication) together with the well-known results of Fine [13] . We will assume that the reader has Fine's paper at hand, so we will not repeat his definitions.
Proof. Consider the frames F 0 , F 1 , etc. in [13] . Let us show that for each F n and Medvedev frame G, there is no p-morphism from G onto F n . Suppose for reductio that there is such a p-morphism f . Let us treat G as h}(S)\{;}, ◆i, and let R n be the edge relation in F n . Since f is onto, for the endpoints 1 and 2 in F n there are x, y 2 G such that f (x) = 1 and f (y) = 2. Then we can pick {a} ✓ x and {b} ✓ y in G, and we must have f ({a}) = 1 and f ({b}) = 2 by the homomorphism condition on f . In addition, {a, b} is in G, and {a, b} ◆ {a} and {a, b} ◆ {b}, so f ({a, b})R n 1 and f ({a, b})R n 2. It follows by the definition of F n that either f ({a, b}) = 0 or f ({a, b}) 5. In either case, f ({a, b})R n 3 or f ({a, b})R n 4. Where k 2 {3, 4}, suppose f ({a, b})R n k. Then by the back condition on f , there is a z 2 G such that {a, b} ◆ z and f (z) = k. But the only candidates for z are {a, b}, {a}, and {b}, and f does not map any of these sets to k, so we have a contradiction.
Since there is no p-morphism from a Medvedev frame onto F n , and the class of Medvedev frames is closed under taking point-generated subframes, it follows by Lemma 1 of [13, §2] that the frame-formula A F n is unsatisfiable over any Medvedev frame. Thus, ¬A F n 2 Medv for each n 2 N. For X ✓ N, let GrzUniX be the least normal unimodal extension of GrzUni containing ¬A F n for each n 2 X, so GrzUniX ✓ Medv.
Finally, it is easy to see that each F n validates GrzUni, by virtue of being a finite poset that satisfies the first-order correspondent for Uni given in Fact 2.3.3. Thus, by the same argument as in Theorem 1 of [13] , for any distinct X, Y ✓ N, we have GrzUniX 6 = GrzUniY.
